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Can we expect the ENP to be more effective than the
EMP regarding the democratization of Morocco?

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1.Introduction

The promotion and the defence of democratic principles, human rights and rule of the law are an essential component of any relationship or cooperation between the EU and third countries. Furthermore, respect of human rights is a founder element of the EU's identity (see article 6 of the Maastricht Treaty or article 130 of the Rome Treaty). Thus, the EU has tried for many years to promote democratization as well as human rights, notably in the Mediterranean area. This democratic aspect was indeed included in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP or Barcelona Process) born in 1995. Today, this ambition constitutes one of the reasons that have lead to the birth of the new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP, 2003) which aims at "strengthening the prosperity, stability and security" of the partner countries.

Studies analyzing the enlargement process of 2004 point out two methods of how the EU can exert influence on third countries: the "rationalist institutionalism" theory uses conditionality and external incentives. The EU actually proposes some advantages to third countries in exchange of the reforms they implement in the direction wished by the EU. The "sociological institutionalism" relies more on persuasion and socialisation: EU rules are here adopted if third countries are convinced that these rules are appropriate for them, thus this strategy is aimed at increasing the identification of third countries with the EU values. Even if these research focused on countries candidates to a full membership in the EU (the 2004 enlargement notably), which is not the case of Morocco, one could expect that the ways to exert an influence on Mediterranean countries regarding democracy can be related to one or the other theory evoked above.

Morocco is an interesting case-study for two main reasons. Firstly, it is one of the Mediterranean countries the more turned towards the EU: even if its candidature has been rejected in 1987, this country has always been willing to maintain particular ties with the EU and it is one of the countries more receptive to EU initiatives. Secondly, Morocco is one of the countries belonging to the ENP the more "opened" and stable, so it seemed more relevant to focus on it rather than on more unstable or authoritarian countries, where the impact of EU policies would be more difficult to evaluate. Being a constitutional monarchy since 1962, Morocco has also known several periods of political liberalizations and can thus be considered as a good test-case in order to evaluate the potential of the ENP.

The EMP has proved to be, according to most authors, quite ineffective in its initial goals, notably in its will to promote democratization in the northern Africa area for example. To try to do better, it seems thus important to precisely know on what methods and tools was based this strategy rather unsuccessful, in order to modify things and consequently to find a new-style of policy that could better reach this goal of democracy promotion in the Mediterranean countries.

Precisely, this paper is aimed at analysing a potential strategy shift operated by the EU between the EMP and the ENP frameworks. By comparing the two methods and instruments used respectively in these two policies, we will try to see if one of these strategies can for instance be more related to the rationalist institutionalism theory and the other to the socialization model, or if on the contrary there is no real shift from part of the EU. Doing so, and also having a look on the internal situation of Morocco, this study may thus give us an analytical insight in order to evaluate the potential of the new ENP and its chances of being successful in its will of promoting or reinforcing democracy in this country. It seems interesting because the EMP and ENP initiatives are two cases where the European Union is trying to push for democratic development in third countries but without the possibility of using the "membership carrot", and in this way the conditionality method is likely to be far less effective (the idea here is to know how the EU can exert an influence on third countries without the membership incentive).

What will be underlined in the present paper is the fact that we can indeed speak about a strategy shift from part of the EU regarding the policy towards the Mediterranean countries. The ENP seems indeed to correct a lot of the deficiencies of the EMP. However, our hypothesis is that given the internal situation of Morocco but also because of some characteristics of the new ENP, it is not sure that this new policy could assure better results than the previous one regarding democratization of Morocco. This work will be divided in several parts. We will firstly present the methodology that will be used and next have a more precise look on the two main theories evoked above, so to have in mind the differences of methods between them. A more analytical part will then be subdivided in two sections: the first one will analyse the strategy shift that the EU operated from the EMP framework to the ENP one. The second section will focus on the case of Morocco, in order to evaluate the potential impact of this strategy shift in the EU will to promote democracy in this particular country, identified as a case-study to have an idea of the main strengths and weaknesses of this new ENP, and thus its potential success or failure.

2. Methodology

To do so, we will firstly present successively the EMP and the ENP and their main characteristics: the toolkit used, the strategy adopted and the actors involved (mainly thanks to information found on the official EU websites), so to identify the strategy shift operated by the EU and its extent. In the second part concerning Morocco, we will present an assessment of results obtained thanks to the EMP as concerns democratization of Morocco from 1995 to 2005, using both EU and external sources, so to have a more objective evaluation of the situation. The goal here is to underline the weak results achieved and so to evaluate the potential of the new ENP: indeed, if there has been a clear shift from one theory to the other compared to the “old” EMP, one can expect, giving the relative failure of the Barcelona Process, the ENP to do better than its predecessor. We will then have a two-stage analysis: the first one will try to assess the strength of the incentives proposed to Morocco by the EU within the framework of the ENP, to know if they are strong enough to really encourage Morocco to implement reforms. Secondly, we will have a more precise look on the internal conditions of Morocco, so to know which actors or factors could prevent the ENP to be effective in this country. Our goal is here to evaluate the potential effectiveness of the ENP in this particular country.

3. The theoretical framework

Europeanization in candidate states can take different forms. It exists actually two main models of EU external governance: the rationalist institutionalism and the sociological institutionalism, clearly presented in the articles of Sedelmeier (2006) and of Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004).

3.1) The rationalist institutionalism

This latter article (about the process of the EU's eastern enlargement, 2004, p663) refers more precisely to the "external incentives model", defined like "a rationalist bargaining model" where the "EU external governance mainly follows a strategy of conditionality in which the EU sets its rules as conditions that the CEECs [Central and Eastern European Countries] have to fulfil in order to receive EU rewards". This model has proved to be the more effective in the case of the enlargement process, and seems to be the one that explain the more the very important economic and social reforms that have taken place. Several rules are likely to explain the more or less big effectiveness of this kind of external governance. First of all, "a state adopts EU rules if the benefits of EU rewards exceed the domestic adoption costs" (P664). Four other rules follow from this first one: "the effectiveness of rule transfer increases if rules are set as conditions for rewards and the more determinate they are" (determinacy hypothesis) (p664), "the effectiveness of rule transfer increases with the size and speed of rewards" (rewards hypothesis) (p665), "the likelihood of rule adoption increases with the credibility of conditional threats and promises" (credibility hypothesis) (p666) and finally "the likelihood of rule adoption decreases with the number of veto players incurring net adoption costs (opportunity costs, welfare and power losses) from compliance" (adoption costs hypothesis) (p667). The effectiveness of this policy thus varies with the credibility of EU conditionality and the domestic costs of rule adoption, precisely the two aspects we will try to analyse latter in the case of Morocco. Especially as concern democratic conditionality, domestic factors seem to affect strongly the relative effectiveness of this strategy. Speaking about enlargement, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier underlined that "effective external governance was restricted to a particular set of countries, namely the more fragile and unstable democracy" (p669) while the effectiveness was limited in the democratic frontrunners and ineffective in undemocratic countries. To be effective for democratization, it seems thus that external EU governance requires some kind of medium resonance in third countries.

The article of Sedelmeier (2006) more or less presents the same definitions but adds also facilitating domestic factors (liberal democratic governments, high quality of political competition at moment of regime change, dominance of liberal ethnic policy preferences in parliament, low actor density/number of veto players, internationalisation of policy sector, absence of institutional legacies) that are likely to assure more efficiency to this conditionality policy (p11).

3.2) Sociological institutionalism

Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier define it as a "social learning model", following a "logic of appropriateness" where "the actors involved are motivated by internalized identities, values and norms" of the EU" (p667). In this model, "a state adopts EU rules if it is persuaded of the appropriateness of EU rules" (p668). It is important to underline, like the authors did, that rules and reforms implemented through social-learning are more likely to be more lasting than the ones implemented through the conditionality model, since this external governance model provokes less contestation at the domestic level than a conditionality strategy and thus much better implementation in the long-term. Given the fact that democratization is a long-term process and that democracy is hard to impose to a country from the outside, this strategy seems then maybe more appropriated in the particular case of human rights and democracy, but maybe less effective in the short-term.

Here again the article of Sedelmeier presents facilitating factors for the socialization strategy that are the identification with EU, the legitimacy of EU demands, a positive normative resonance with domestic rules or the existence of transnational (epistemic) networks. This article underlines this presence of transnational networks connecting elites of both sides that is a facilitating factor for the EU's influence and this for both Europeanization strategies.

What can these theories concerning the case of candidate countries and notably the enlargement process of 2004 can bring to our analysis of Morocco (not a candidate country) and policies devoted to neighbourhood countries? The enlargement process and the policies directed to the European neighbourhood differ quite strongly. Indeed, the incentive of membership is not offered to these neighbourhood countries (what can limit strongly the effectiveness of conditionality), and thus they are not really bind to implement reforms wished by the EU, contrary to candidate countries. In the same way, the transfer of the *acquis* is not required in the case of the neighbourhood countries, whereas it was binding for candidate countries. However, we strongly believe that the

theories evoked above can be really useful in our analysis, even if the conditions are not similar. We will indeed see later that the EMP as well as the ENP refer more or less clearly to one or the other of these theories, theories that can already give us some indications for our analysis: in the case of conditionality strategy for instance, this policy is likely to be effective in Morocco if certain conditions are met, like the presence of a medium situation as concerns the democratization process, the presence of strong incentives encouraging strongly Morocco to implement reforms or the absence of veto-players. We know now that this conditionality strategy can be effective in Morocco if incentives proposed to this country exceed the domestic adoption costs. It is precisely what we will try to see in our analytical part.

Once these theories in mind, we can now turn to our analytical part, beginning firstly to a compared analysis of the EMP and ENP.

4. Analysis

4.1) From the EMP to the ENP: why can we speak about a real strategy shift?

This part will present successively the two policies, methods and tools used but also the actors involved, so to discover the logics governing these two different strategies.

On the European Commission website¹, the **Barcelona Process** is described as “a wide framework of political, economic and social relations” between the EU and countries of the Southern Mediterranean. This **Euro-Mediterranean Partnership**, born in 1995, has three main objectives: “the definition of a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political and security dialogue”, “the construction of a zone of shared prosperity through an economic and financial partnership and the gradual establishment of a free-trade area” and “the rapprochement between peoples through a social, cultural and human partnership aimed at encouraging understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies”. This process involves both a bilateral (association agreements) and a regional dimension. The website of *La Documentation française*² provide more information about this EMP. The Association Agreements are the main instruments for bilateral cooperation and cover the three sections evoked above. They also involve conditionality clauses regarding notably democracy and human rights. This policy is mainly financed through the MEDA instrument. The use of this money is subordinated to some demands, regarding notably respect of human rights. Indeed, within the framework of the first chapter, the partner countries committed themselves to support the development of democracy, human rights and fundamental liberties. Finally, the last section aims at developing the dialogue between cultures and civilisations of both sides of the Mediterranean. The Euro-Mediterranean Anna Lindh foundation has been thus created in 2004 to develop cultural dialogue. Since 1995, lots of networks have also been created in diverse areas where the civil society is highly implicated. Forums of the civil society exist also when the Euro-Mediterranean conferences of foreign ministry affairs take place and a non-governmental platform has been created in 2003 for the civil Forum Euromed, which includes hundreds of organizations. Speaking about this Barcelona Process, Adler said in 1998 that “behind the EMP [...] lies the [...] idea that the most promising –perhaps only- way to achieve long-term security, economic welfare,

¹ http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index.htm

political stability, and peace in the Mediterranean area is [...] the socio-cultural process of constructing a region" (quoted in Moschella, p9), insisting thus on the socialization dimension of this policy. In the same way, Emerson, Aydin, Noutcheva, Tocci, Vahl & Youngs (2005, p200-201) underline the same "socialization aspect", arguing that during the EMP "a network of cooperation" with state and non-state actors has developed in the Maghreb. For them, "the EMP represents a clear example of "socialisation" dynamics being generated through incrementally ratcheted-up commitments to institutionalised cooperation". Finally, they state that "the plethora of committees and dialogue forums responsible for managing the EMP does appear to have helped generate a greater degree of shared understanding around human rights and democratic reform concerns".

The **European Neighbourhood Policy** has been created ten years (2004) after the launching of the Barcelona Process and is not meant to replace the EMP (see the official website). The official website of the ENP³ underlines that the European Union offers to its (Eastern and Southern) neighbours a privileged relationship based on a mutual commitment to shared values like democracy, human rights, the rule of the law, good governance, principles of a market economy and sustainable development. The EU is thus offering a deeper political and economic integration to the partner countries, as compared to previous initiatives, but the level of this relationship will depend on the relative importance of shared values. Here, the main tools are the bilateral action plans signed between the EU and each partner country, specifying a list of political and economic reforms to accomplish in the short and medium terms by third countries. In these bilateral action plans, incentives are proposed to the Mediterranean countries in return for the reforms engaged. As we can read on the *Documentation française* website, the ENP is a conditional process (for funding, technical cooperation and participation to European programs): the European assistance will depend upon the commitment of the partner countries for the reforms engaged. According to the Commission, "in return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, including in aligning legislation with the *acquis*, the EU's neighbourhood should benefit from the prospects of closer economic integration with the EU...the prospect of a stake in the EU's Internal Market and further integration and liberalisation to promote the free movement of –persons, goods, services and capital" (quoted in the article of Baracani, 2004, p45). We can find the entire list of incentives proposed by the EU (eleven incentives for the time being, like the extension of the internal market, a preferential trading relations and market opening, a greater EU political involvement in conflict prevention and crisis management, a greater efforts to

³ http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_fr.htm

promote human rights or an integration into transport, energy and telecommunications networks) and in exchange of what they are proposed (for instance commitment to common values in the following fields: democracy, rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights, principles of market economy, free trade or essential aspects of the EU's external action such as the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) in the article of Baracani (2005, table 1 in the Appendix). The ENP proposes thus a deeper integration to the neighbourhood but excludes for the time being any possibility of membership. This is even more true for the Mediterranean countries (as compared to countries like Ukraine for instance), notably Morocco whose candidature to join the European Community has been rejected in 1987.

Within the framework of the ENP, the socialization method is also used through mechanisms of soft institutional coordination but these mechanisms do not play an important role as compared to the primacy of the conditionality method (Meloni, 2007, p104). About this particular subject, Tocci (2007, p26) notes that "the civil society focus of the ENP was strengthened further in the Commission's 2006 Communication, which aimed at enhancing people-to-people contacts", but also that "yet notwithstanding these efforts at deepening the neighbours' exposure to the EU's normative framework, the degree of contacts these initiatives will give rise to is likely to remain far below what would be necessary to induce democracy and human rights through social learning" (p32).

We can here note with Meloni that the ENP "has borrowed from enlargement the same combination of conditionality and socialization strategies already used with candidate countries" (p108), what is besides clearly states on the ENP official website⁴ ("the ENP [...] uses proven methodology (that has already helped us to support transition in central and southeastern Europe) and incentives to promote democratic and economic reforms, supporting the countries' own efforts"). The importance of transnational networks can be here recalled: indeed, previous to the enlargement of 2004, EU-centred networks of experts and officials have been developed in Eastern Europe and there have been dense interaction between CEECs officials and experts with EU counterparts (Schimmelfennig&Sedelmeier, 2004, p673) parallel to the major strategy of conditionality and reinforcement by reward thanks to external incentives proposed by the EU. And, as it has been underlined above, such a combination has proved to be effective, that is partly why the EU has decided to try to do the same with neighbourhood countries.

The EU seems thus to have operated a quite clear strategy shift. Firstly, contrary to the old EMP, the ENP privileges the use of conditionality ("external incentives model" of Schimmelfennig&Sedelmeier) rather than a socialization strategy (strong component

⁴ http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/faq_en.htm

of the EMP), even if this latest is not totally absent in the ENP. Secondly, the very timid negative conditionality of the EMP has been replaced in the ENP by a strong positive conditionality. Indeed, "in the framework of the Barcelona Process, Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements contained the clause that the agreements may be suspended if the respective partner state violated the respect for human rights. However, the EU never made any use of this principle in practice" (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005, p22).

The ENP in this way seems to try to correct some of the defaults of the old EMP, perhaps responsible for its failure regarding democracy and human rights. As it has already been underlined before, this strong conditionality strategy combined to socialization mechanisms has already been tried and tested in the past and in other contexts with very positive results, notably as concerns the 2004 enlargement. Baracani (2004, p43) underlines that "democracy promotion through enlargement has been the most important and successful strategy of democratization" and that "the use of conditionality has been the key element of the last enlargement process to structure relations with candidate countries". Sedelmeier (2006, p14) also showed that factors characteristics of rationalist institutionalism (the credibility of the incentives of membership and the incumbent government's material power costs of adjustment) explain better EU's influence on liberal democratic principles and socio-economic politics than factors of other methods, such as socialization. Moreover, it is clear according to many authors that the new ENP attaches more importance to democracy and human rights than the previous European initiatives, notably the EMP. For Tocci, (2007, p25), "a greater specification of human rights and democratic standards together with the institutionalization and operationalization of joint ownership entrust the ENP with greater potential to promote democracy and human rights within its neighbours". What impact can this strategy shift observed have concerning democratization in Morocco?

4.2) Can this strategy shift permit the ENP to be more effective than the old EMP regarding the democratization of Morocco?

As underlined by Johansson-Noguès (2004, p245), it is important here to “recall the hitherto weak EU record on democracy and human rights promotion, especially in the Mediterranean region”. The Freedom House reports seem to confirm such an analysis. This website⁵ provides country ratings on freedom in the world from 1972 to 2006. From 1995 to 2005 (period of the EMP framework), on a one-to-seven scale (one representing the highest level of freedom and seven the lowest), Morocco gets 5 all the years as concerns political rights and 4 or 5 for civil liberties (that is to say exactly the same than in 1972) and is thus classified for all the period as a country only “partly free”. In the 2007 report of the Freedom House, a list of problems existing in Morocco is presented that we can also find in Baracani’s article (2005, p11-12): no real guarantee of the principle of separation of powers, parliament’s powers limited due to the omnipresence of the King, problems with the independence of the justice and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, freedom of expression, assembly, association and religion to reinforce, corruption.... . If we now have a look on sources produced by the EU, we can for instance read in the EU/Morocco Action Plan⁶ (that could also be considered as an assessment of the EMP policy, since it has been elaborated in 2005 within the framework of the new ENP) that several issues are important to consider in this country like the consolidation of the administrative bodies responsible for reinforcing respect for democracy and the rule of the law, the necessity of facilitating the access to justice and the law, cooperation in tackling corruption, the need to ensure the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms according to international standards, freedoms of association and expression.

Given these facts, one could thus reasonably expect the ENP (given the strategy shift we have noted) to achieve better than the EMP the goals of democratization and promotion of human rights in the EU neighbourhood. However, only a more precise focus on the conditions characteristics of Morocco can give us a clear idea of the potential of this new policy in this particular country. Morocco seems to consider the ENP as a major step forwards in their relations with the EU (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005, p30), what is a positive element. In the document of Emerson, Noutcheva and Popescu, Morocco is therefore classified as a “willing country” and is among the Southern countries

⁵ <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15>

⁶ http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_fr.htm#2

"the most positive partner" (2006, p9), what is confirmed by the first report made by the Commission about the ENP implementation in Morocco (see official website). We can also read that "its enthusiastic engagement with the ENP and relatively early adoption of an Action Plan are indicative of Morocco's aspiration to anchor its reform process to deep cooperation and integration with the EU" (p26). Here we can see why Morocco has been chosen as a test-case in our study: this country is indeed in a situation of democratic transition, what is likely to facilitate EU's influence (see Schimmelfennig&Sedelmeier), and seems to be really willing to cooperate with the EU. This way, if the ENP is, according to our work, not likely to be completely effective in Morocco as concerns democracy and human rights, we can expect this policy to be even less effective in authoritarian countries or at least countries less willing to commit themselves with the EU.

4.2.1: the "incentives problem"

In order to evaluate the potential of the ENP in Morocco and the potential effectiveness of the incentives proposed, a quick return to the theory and to the hypothesis formulated by Schimmelfennig&Sedelmeier (presented in our first part) is useful. Indeed, if the "credibility hypothesis" does not seem to pose problems (given the relative modesty of the incentives proposed, there is no reason that the EU cannot keep its promises), we can ask ourselves questions about two other hypothesis, namely the "determinacy hypothesis" and the "rewards hypothesis". The ENP is not the same that enlargement: as pointed out by Nathalie Tocci (2007, p32), in the case of enlargement, "the EU's conditions were far more specific and binding, the incentives were stronger and conditionality was more credible". Above all, the membership is not (at least for the time being) proposed to the countries taking part into the ENP. Well it was precisely this membership perspective that permitted the success of the external incentives model in CEECs and it is not easy to find incentives equivalent to this 'membership carrot'. As underlined by Del Sarto and Schumacher (2005, p37), "the cost-benefit ratio is not the same as in the case of prospective EU membership". We can thus have doubts about the effectiveness of the incentives offered. For Meloni (2007, p99-100), "the economic incentives thus far offered by the Union is not enough in order to justify *per se* the engagement in a far reaching process of legislative approximation". We can find the same idea in the article of Sven Biscop (2004, p28): "for positive conditionality to be effective, a *real* 'carrot' should be offered by the EU".

The modesty of the incentives offered maybe reflects the weak ambition of the EU in its will of promoting democracy in the Mediterranean area. Indeed, according to some authors, if the EU does not try to do much, or better for democratization in the

neighbourhood area (notably the Mediterranean), it is because the EU is mainly interested in security issues (fight against terrorism and illegal immigration) and thus the ENP a very Euro-centric policy. For Baracani (2005, p17), "it seems that the European Union has decided to continue with its traditional policy towards this area [...], limited to achieving partial political reforms, rather than a genuine democratic transition [...] the Commission has not translated into political priorities the necessity to respect the principle of the separation of powers, to increase parliament powers, to strengthen the role of political parties, to guarantee judicial independence and legal accountability, and to guarantee the equal implementation of human rights". Being more interested in short term goals such as security, the EU seems thus to pay less attention to lasting reforms and real democratic transition. However, the limited effects we expect the ENP to have in promoting democracy and human rights in Morocco are also due to internal factors, and not only to the weaknesses of EU policy.

4.2.2: internal conditions and domestic factors

Theory also underlined the importance of internal conditions in each country, especially for democracy promotion. Indeed, "in the context of democratic conditionality, domestic adoption costs severely limited the effectiveness of EU conditionality – even when it was credible and rewards were sizeable. Authoritarian governments turned down the offer of membership rather than accept the political power costs of adopting liberal democratic rules" (Schemmelfennig&Sedelmeier, 2004, p663). More precisely, we can read that "the size of domestic adoption costs and their distribution among domestic actors determine whether they will accept or reject the conditions" (p666). Thus, "the effectiveness of conditionality, then, depends on the preferences of the government and those of other "veto players"", what is in accordance with adoption costs hypothesis (see above). Concerning democratic conditionality, initial conditions in each country are key-factors of the effectiveness of the external incentives model. It is likely that these facts, evoked about the 2004 enlargement, concerned also countries participating in the ENP, since the same model of external governance is applied. Adoption costs and preferences of the governments are the more determinate factors to consider here, rather than the determinacy of conditions or the size and the speed of rewards. The general proposition of the external incentives model presented in their article is based on one main hypothesis: "a state adopts EU rules if the benefits of EU rewards exceed the domestic adoption costs" (p664).

This main hypothesis precisely can raise doubts about the potential effectiveness of the ENP in a country like Morocco in situation of democratic consolidation. Indeed, even if we are not in the case of an authoritarian regime, the King and his partners can be considered powerful veto players as defined by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, and can be strong opponents to the democratization process in Morocco, since it is not obvious that the rewards offered by the EU can “compensate” the domestic adoption costs of implementing reforms on democracy and human rights aspects, implying a power loss for the King, especially given what has already been underlined above about the relative modesty of the rewards offered. Several articles underline this very problematic aspect. SENYÜCEL, GÜNER, FAATH and MATTES (2006, p15) underlined the “consistent orientation towards Europe” of Morocco, since its independence in 1956. However, they also pointed out that “external demands for the democratisation of Morocco [...] are vehemently rejected by all political actors” and “political and social actors unanimously reject all external interference in “Morocco’s affairs”. In the same way, Gillepsie and Whitehead (2002, p194) insist both on the fact that Morocco made “positive statements on democracy and human rights” and on the very strong power of the King and the monarchy, King that has besides claimed several times his refusal to follow “any European models of democratization” and rather to privilege a “strong, democratic *executive* monarchy”. Chourou (2002) is also concerned with the strong power of the monarch: “the country has some of the features of a democratic system, such as a parliament and a number of political parties, but ultimate power is in the hands of the king. Most acts depend on his initiative and goodwill, including those that are defining characteristics of a democracy, such as respect of laws and human rights” (p30), what is according to the author the main obstacle to democratization. Even if this feature is maybe less strong with the new King Mohamed VI (at power since 1999) than it was the case with Hassan II, it remains a quite problematic aspect, as pointed out by the latest Freedom House report (“Morocco is not an electoral democracy. [...], most of the power in Morocco still lies in the hands of the king and his close advisers. The monarch can at any moment dissolve Parliament, rule by decree, and dismiss or appoint cabinet members. [...] [he] presides over the judicial system. [...] Morocco’s opposition parties are not able to assert themselves given the king’s extensive power”). Like Johansson-Noguès sums up (2004, p17), “notwithstanding a long political liberalization, most of the academic literature believes that involvement of the king in these moves towards democracy is disruptive of any democratic development”.

Thus, even if we are here facing a “fragile and unstable democracy” (where the influence of the EU is supposed to be the strongest), it is not guaranteed that the ENP will achieve good results in Morocco.

Furthermore, the domestic facilitating factors evoked by Sedelmeier (see p5 of this paper) do not seem to be present in Morocco and thus the potential effectiveness of the external conditionality model can thus be severely limited. As underlined before, Morocco has not a real liberal democratic government and it exists in this country powerful veto-players. Moreover, as concerns the quality of political competition, the opposition parties are quite weak in this country: the strongest opposition to the monarch comes from moderate Islamist parties (Freedom House report) while we note "the existence of relatively mobilisation weak parties within the non-Islamist spectrum" (SENYÜCEL, GÜNER, FAATH and MATTES, 2006, p16), what can limit the EU possibilities to sustain opposition through the ENP, since we can suppose that the European countries will be hesitant to support the development of Islamist parties.

5. Conclusion

Through this work, we have seen the potential effectiveness of the new ENP in promoting democratization in Morocco. If the shift from the old and quite unsuccessful EMP to the ENP seems to be a positive step, notably using a methodology that has been very successful in the past, it is not however guaranteed that the ENP will manage to obtain the same results than the enlargement process as concerns democracy and human rights, at least in the case of Morocco we are interested in here. As it has been underlined, even if the ENP has been welcomed really positively in Morocco, it is quite doubtful that the powerful “veto-players” present in this country will be really ready to let their power goes in exchange of the rewards offered by the EU. The main question here is to whether or not the veto-players are sufficiently interested in the incentives proposed by the EU to undertake the necessary reforms. We can also ask ourselves questions about the mix between a claimed “partnership” between both sides and the use of conditionality: this partnership is not clear and can also handicap the effectiveness of the ENP. Finally, we can deplored the fact that the ENP is not trying to put more emphasis on the “socialization” side, since this aspect has also been important during the 2004 process and because we know that reforms initiated trough this method are more lasting and less subject to resistance. However, and even if Morocco can be considered as a good test-case for this new initiative, the ENP is a really young policy, and only time will permit us to assess the real value and effectiveness of this policy. The only aim of such a work was to present the different existing arguments to have a better idea of the potential of this particular policy for a particular country usually positively oriented towards the EU, and not to make predictions about the becoming of the ENP.

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